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Current Trends in Non-Performing Hotel Loan Investments
Overview, Market Opportunities, Challenges, and Investment Strategies

Introduction
Based on recent estimates, outstanding commercial real estate debt in the United
States is at $3.12 trillion (ULI and PwC, 2010). Of this universe, there are currently over
U.S.1.5 trillion in commercial real estate (CRE) mortgages coming due over the next four
years. Some industry experts estimate half of these maturing CRE loans may be “underwater” (Grinis, 2010), where the debt service is higher than the underlying market value
of the asset. As such, debt buyers today are keen to acquire properties at significant
discounts to their loan values- offering far greater savings than purchasing the property
through traditional equity (Heschmeyer, 2010). Lenders are interesting selling loans
which are not performing (when a borrow does not meet debt service) because they may
want liquidity on their balance sheet, regulators or investors could force a loan sale or the
lending institution may be failing and receivers sell the assets individually or collectively.
According to Bruce Lowrey of RockBridge Capital, “a rolling loan gathers no loss.” Thus
far in the crisis, “extend and pretend” (Appendix B), where banks allow borrowers more
time to repay their loans, has continued to be the resolution of choice (Barrack, 2010).
Non-performing loan (NPL) pricing has, and continues to be, the largest barrier to greater
NPL sale transaction volume. However, recent reports suggest that the bid-ask gap may
be narrowing and increased transaction volume could materially increase in the near
future (Grinis, 2010). Furthermore, as the percentage of high risk non-performing loans
have increased in bank portfolios, there is an increase in the number of NPL loans
available, as banks want them removed from their balance sheets.
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Experts estimate that hospitality debt is at $350 billion or about 10 percent of the
total Commercial Real Estate loans outstanding. The weak operating and economic
fundamentals since 2008 have increased the pressure on several hotels to meet their debt
service obligations. As such, many of these loans are in various stages of distress. In
some cases loans are coming due and borrowers do not have the ability to refinance these
loans. In several cases, banks have failed to further extend or restructure loans and the
negative equity has made it prudent for the borrower to hand over the keys to the lender,
colloquially known in the industry as “Jingle mail.” (Appendix B) In a growing number
of cases, where the borrower has not paid its scheduled payment for 60-90 days banks
and special servicers have initiated foreclosure proceedings to take back the hotel asset. A
case in point was the 258 room W hotel in San Diego, owned by Sunstone Hotel
Investors, a REIT. Debt for the hotel was part of a CMBS pool ($60 Million), originated
in 2007. By 2010 the hotel could not pay debt service and hotel was worth less than the
loan. As a result Sunstone Investors returned the hotel to the lender. In fact Sunstone
turned over a total of 11 hotels to their lender Mass Mutual in 2010. As a result of this
strategic decision, Sunstone reduced its debt burden from $434 million due to mature in
2011 to $180 million with maturities through 2014. From the company’s perspective this
decision has improved their credit profile, debt maturity schedule, portfolio quality and
made cash available to take advantage of opportunistic investments for growth,
(Commercial Real Estate, 2010).
In other cases these loans are already a part of lender’s increasing pile of REO
(Real Estate Owned) assets (Appendix B). In the hospitality industry hotel distress
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started as early as 2008. Real Capital Analytics, which tracks distressed real estate assets,
noted that as of June 2009, there were over 1000 troubled hotel assets worth $15.7
billion, (Higgins, 2009). In California, for example, a survey conducted by the Atlas
Group revealed that in the 4th quarter of 2010, 465 California hotels were in default or
had been foreclosed on (Atlas Hospitality Group, 2010). Many of these defaulted loans
trace their origins to the boom times between 2005-2007, when capital was available and
loan underwriting standards were lax. Several of these loans were pooled into
Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS). These loans started to unravel in
2008-2009, beginning with delinquency and graduating to foreclosed status. While in the
early stages most of these properties were unbranded, limited service in nature, later they
started to include branded properties in prime locations (Walsh, 2009). As a response to
these potential opportunities several investment funds, REITS, and overseas buyers have
emerged in the past year with a specific focus of investing in non-performing hotel debt
and equity. These are similar in nature to the opportunity funds which emerged in the
early 1990’s and may be defined as “a source of capital that has a contrarian investment
focus on under-performing properties and loans” (Carlson, 1997). A case in point,
Colony Capital in partnership with Cogsville Group won a bid on US$1.85 billion of
distressed commercial real estate loans which were auctioned by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the summer of 2010, (Turner, 2010). Table 2 outlines an
illustrative list of distressed investment transactions in the past two years which were
opportunistic in nature.
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Purpose and Significance of Study
This study is designed as a primer to create a baseline understanding of trends in
non-performing commercial real estate loans and specifically hotel loans. The study will
seek to define non-performing commercial real estate loans, understand the historical
economic and regulatory factors that created conditions for non performance describe and
identify the current participant buyers and sellers, for non-performing loans and analyze
several investment strategies to opportunistically invest in non-performing commercial
real estate loans, with an emphasis on hotel debt. The timeliness of study is its primary
contribution as it would document the players, processes and investment strategies during
this unique and less understood period in the real estate investment cycle.
Methodology
This study will primarily rely on an extensive review of secondary sources to
include historic and current literature, company reports, white papers, books and
conference proceedings. In addition, the research will supplement this information with a
structured survey and phone interviews with experts knowledgeable about the nonperforming hotel loan market (Table 1).

Economic and Regulatory Causes of Commercial Real Estate (CRE) Distress
To fully understand today’s CRE NPL investment market, it is important to study
and analyze previous real estate cycles to gain the necessary perspective. The 1974
passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) required pension
funds to have enough capital on-hand to fund future pension benefit liabilities promised
by the fund. ERISA’s implicit sponsorship of Modern Portfolio Theory, a financial
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theory supporting broad diversification across asset classes, led fund managers to look for
new asset classes to allocate capital. Real estate was a natural progression to consider
outside of traditional stocks and bonds. During this time, pension fund contributions
ballooned as the baby-boomer generation was thrust into the labor force. As a result,
institutional capital made its first major entrée into commercial property investment
(Geltner, 2001).
In 1982, the Reagan administration passed a real estate tax-cut incentive that
furthered the inflation protection/institutional allocation derived demand for real estate
investment. The tax change allowed increased depreciation and pass-through to ordinary
income of losses experienced through CRE investments. Of equal importance,
deregulation of the savings and loans industry allowed S&L’s to invest in CRE
mortgages for the first time. The tax incentives and new source of capital combined to
continue the boom in CRE valuations until the mid-1980’s (Geltner, 2001).
The continued boom in CRE valuations combined with tax incentives that did not
always align the investor’s investment value with underlying property fundamentals,
contributed to one of the largest construction booms in history. The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance and its related moral hazard gave incentive to
the inexperienced Savings and Loan institutions (S&L’s) to finance much of the new
construction; which they did. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reversed the CRE taxbenefits passed by the Reagan Administration and destroyed tax-driven demand for CRE.
Additionally, tighter monetary policy stabilized the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and
hampered real estate’s appeal as an inflationary hedge. These two factors combined with
the extreme overbuilding in the space market and resulted in an erosion of CRE asset
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market valuations. An economic recession and stock market drop in 1990 finally caused
the already weakened commercial property market to suffer catastrophic losses. CRE
asset-valuations fell 40-50 percent peak to trough from 1989-1992 (Geltner, 2001). This
devaluation was the largest the industry had experienced since the Great Depression
(Geltner, 2001). Commercial real estate loan balances, which were underwritten with
high loan-to-value ratios by thrift institutions, exceeded the value of the property. Thus
commercial real estate developers and owners found themselves in a negative equity
position, and chose to exercise their “put option” by defaulting on their mortgages. The
savings and loan crisis had begun.
Congress responded to the S&L crisis by passing the Financial Institutions
Recovery, Reform, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). FIRREA set up the
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), a government corporation, with the goal of selling
large number of non-performing commercial real estate mortgages held by failed S&L
institutions taken over by regulators after January 1, 1989. The RTC liquidated failed
thrift’s CRE loan portfolios through direct bulk sales, bulk sales via auction, and
mortgage securitizations. In regard to mortgage securitization, FIRREA created the
incentive to financially engineer CMBS by imposing risk-adjusted capital requirements
on financial institutions; this innovation would then allow them to hold assets in
securitized form rather than as whole loans. Non-performing Loan (NPL) bulk-sales
employed extensive equity partnerships with private sector investment funds to allow for
RTC participation in the NPL investment’s upside. The private sector partner would
acquire a partial interest in a pool of assets, controlling the management and sale of assets
in the pool, and would have a fiduciary responsibility to distribute profits back to the
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RTC reflective of the RTC’s retained interest in the pool. Private sector general partners
were selected based on price bid as a percentage of the derived-investment value (an
estimate of liquidation value based on a valuation formula developed by the RTC). The
highest qualified bidder in a competitive auction won. Government financing to facilitate
the deal was handled in two ways. In RTC S-Series and Multiple Investor Fund (MIF)
Partnerships, the RTC offered up to 79% direct seller financing from the RTC. On the
other hand, RTC N-Series Partnerships were leveraged by issuing CMBS, the proceeds of
which went to the RTC. Seller financing or CMBS debt service had the first claim on
any NPL pool cash flows. After first claim debt service was paid, residual cash flows
were divided between the private sector investment fund and the RTC pursuant to their
respective equity ownership. Overall, the RTC disposed of $394 billion of assets from
747 banks between 1989 and 1995 according to an FDIC published report in 2000
(Bloomberg, 2009).
Real estate opportunity funds were created to take advantage of the RTC loan and
property sales. The first opportunity fund created to capitalize on RTC NPL debt
liquidation was Colony Capital I. Colony’s founder, Tom Barrack, recognized the
enormous opportunity through his successful experience purchasing distressed CRE debt
from the government’s first good bank-bad bank structured bail-out, American Savings.
Colony I was organized with a finite life with a goal of midterm extraordinary gain rather
than long-term residual growth. Other industry leaders followed suit with massive
success. Overall, average internal rates of return on opportunistic CRE NPL funds from
1991 to 1995 were 70% with average finite life of 18 months (Conwell). By 1995 most
of the NPL problems in the U.S. had been resolved. However, no one in the CRE
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industry forgot the great success enjoyed by practitioners skilled in recognizing and
realizing opportunities in CRE NPL’s (Haas, 2006).
The unprecedented expansion of the REIT industry and the development of the
Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS) industry resultant from the FIRREA
regulations and the S&L crisis contributed to relative stability and growth in CRE
valuations until around 2007. Low interest rates and a regulatory environment that
encouraged easy credit led to an enormous asset price bubble to form in housing prices.
The bubble eventually burst and exposed extensive fraud, counterparty risks, and over
leveraging throughout the financial sector as a whole. During the unprecedented rise in
residential home prices, new securitization innovations led to lax underwriting standards
in commercial real estate as well. Commercial real estate rental increase projections were
estimated at levels that, in hind-sight, were completely unjustifiable and unsustainable.
Real estate professionals and building owners always assumed a steady growth model at
either the Consumer’s Price Index for the area or a flat 3% increase in yearly rental rates.
They did not however, realize that because of their high Loan to Value Ratios, any
corrections in the rental market due to outside economic factors such as a housing
valuation bubble or the forced bankruptcies of large auto manufacturers to name a few,
would create not only a decrease in rents but also vacancies thus perpetuating the decline
of CRE values. On new acquisition transactions, capitalization rate contraction was so
severe that cap-rates were, in some cases, only basis points above the risk-free interest
rate. Eventually, values began to reflect the true space market fundamentals, (it is
interesting to note that on an inflation adjusted basis, there has been virtually no rental
rate growth across any product type since 1994 (Barrrak, 2010), and greatly increased
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risk in the market. Increased CRE leverage and expanded exit valuations dried up and
underwriters responded with decreased Loan-to-value ratios across every product type.
Thus, greatly reduced value and insufficient capital has rendered CRE owners unable to
refinance their maturing debt obligations. This problem has been exponentially multiplied
by the massive amount of CRE loans for 2005 vintage with five-year balloon provisions.
The resultant CRE NPL fall-out is a large part of the current economic crisis and experts
predict it will continue or expand going forward (Levy, 2010).

Individual Borrower Default: Decision Framework

There are several stages that a CRE loan goes through to reach non-performing
status. Inasmuch as many commercial mortgages contain an exculpatory clause (the only
thing a lender can take in the event of default is property pledged as collateral), a type of
borrower’s put option exists for commercial property owners with such non-recourse
mortgages encumbering their property. Put options allow the option holder the right
without obligation to sell a specified asset at a specified price (Geltner, 2001). When
analyzing the quasi put-option inherent in non-recourse lending, it is evident that the
underlying asset is the collateral property. Because the borrower has the ability to default
on the loan, this effectively allows the borrower the ability to sell the property back to the
lender at a price equal to the value of the outstanding loan balance (Ciochetti,1998).
Through default, the borrower is thought to “put” the property back to the lender and rid
himself of the book value liability of outstanding loan balance (Geltner, 2001). High
loan-to-value rates on vintage 2005-2006 originated commercial real estate loans
combined with the subsequent destruction of CRE values has created an enormous
14

proportion of outstanding loans meeting this criteria. Such borrowers may be thought to
be in a position of “negative-equity”. Default suddenly makes sense for a borrower
whenever the net present value (NPV) of the property’s future expected cash flows is less
than the outstanding balance on the loan. Consequently, some of commercial real estate
borrowers have chosen to exercise this quasi “put” option. In the hotel industry the most
recent example is of Sunstone Hotel Investors that handed back 11 of their hotel
properties to the lender, MassMutual in 2010. At the time of the strategic decision last
year, market value of the portfolio was about $173 million, and it launched a schedule of
giving back hotels that had become worth less than what was owed on them during the
downturn. According to their Chief Financial Officer, this was a value creating strategic
decision as it benefited the company’s credit profile, debt maturity schedule, and overall
portfolio quality and allowed them to position for new acquisitions. The restructured
position reduced Sunstone’s debt maturities through 2014 to $180 million as compared to
$432 million in 2009 (Commercial Real Estate Direct.com, 2010).

Performing and Non-Performing Loans
The process begins when the property owner chooses, or is forced, to miss a
scheduled monthly payment. After missing a single or in some cases subsequent monthly
payments, the loan is classified as “delinquent” and depending on the terms of the note
could be in “default”. The borrower typically still has plenty of room to negotiate and
make-up the initial payment. However, once the loan has gone past due by 60 days, or
two scheduled payments, servicing functions are transferred from the master
servicer/sub-servicer, who is charged with monitoring the distribution of interest and
principal payments, and handling routine services such as bookkeeping and collecting
15

payments, to a special servicer who is charged with deciding the most effective manner to
workout the loan. These strategies could consist of modification, curing the delinquency,
foreclosing on the property, or selling the note/mortgage. It is also important to note that
at this stage in the default process, the loan is classified as a non-performing commercial
real estate loan. Appendix B has identified several new terms related to distressed debt
which have become part of the new lexicon in real estate.
Motivations for Lenders to Sell Non-Performing Loans
In unforced hold-sell banking asset management decisions, it only makes sense to
sell a NPL if the sale proceeds would be higher than the new present value of the net cash
inflows from the loan (Appendix A). Banks consider all costs of staff, costs of execution
proceedings, additional capital expenditure required to sell the collateral asset, and all
other costs associated with working out the NPL versus the total discounted realizable
value of principal repayment at maturity combined with all discounted interest payment
cash flows. If costs exceed the NPV of all discounted cash flows associated with the
mortgage, then holding onto the loan represents a negative NPV decision; the loan should
be sold in such a case. Investment managers operating under opportunity fund structures
typically employ highly specialized professionals experienced in executing all workout
responsibilities and tasks in the most efficient and cost effective manner. This difference
in total cost of workout between the banking institution and private investment funds
often provide the motivation necessary to facilitate a transaction. Banks typically focus
far more on nominal values of their assets due to accounting, capital regulatory, and
pressure to meet earnings rather than in net present value. On the other hand, NPL
investors focus on the present value that each individual loan within the portfolio can
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bring to the investment portfolio and the firm’s clients. Moreover, NPL purchasers are
not engaged in relationship-banking with the debtor. Therefore, any concerns about
damaging a relationship by harshly enforcing all provisions of the loan and extracting as
much as value as possible from the debtor will not likely result in decreased future
earning potential. NPL loan divestment also allows banks to lower their ratio of risk
assets and improve their capital regulatory ratios to comply with Basel II risk-based
capital regulatory requirements. Speaking on a distressed loan panel at the America’s
Lodging Investment Summit, Mr. Joel Hiser, Principal at Horwath HTL, stated that
regulators are not pressuring banks to sell the loans as was the case in the previous cycle
of the early 1990s. In this case the banks have a lot more leeway because the loans are so
distressed, (ALIS conference, January, 2011). Table 2 has identified some high profile
non-performing hotel loan transactions.

Investors in Distressed Commercial Real Estate Debt
A typical pattern of commercial real estate investments during a downturn has
been the emergence of alternate sources of financing when traditional, risk averse,
sources of capital are scarce. A type of market participant that invests in either distressed
assets or debt securities has been known as a “contrarian,” “opportunity” or “vulture,”
investor. As such, these investors which are generally organized as funds acquire underperforming hotel properties (or other forms of real estate) and loans, with the purpose of
turning around the investments through repositioning, restructuring, or updating, and then
waiting for the market to improve before disposing the investment. Many of these funds
started in 1990 when the Resolution Trust Corporation was disposing of the real estate
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assets of failed S&Ls. The majority of the early acquisitions of these funds were during
the period from 1990–1992, generally considered to be the bottom of the real estate cycle,
(Singh, 1999).
As noted previously in this article, current underperforming and non performing
loans have created climate conducive for opportunistic investment in commercial real
estate debt, as such several opportunity funds started to emerge in 2008. Of the $85
billion tracked in real estate investment fund raising in 2008, 58.6 percent were
opportunistic, (Anderson, Cascioli, et al, 2009). Among these funds, the five largest were:
The Blackstone Group, Morgan Stanley Real Estate, Goldman Sachs, Colony Capital and
Beacon Capital Partners, (Shilling and Wurtzebach, 2010). Acquisition Funds with a
specific interest in Hospitality distressed investments have also emerged and are outlined
in Table 3 of this article.
In addition, hedge funds are most likely to invest in distressed debt. These funds
are largely unregulated and organized as limited liability companies or partnerships for
the express purpose of investing. The light nature of regulatory oversight gives them a
competitive advantage in alternative investments such as distressed debt, (Eisenberg,
2007). As seen in the current cycle Hedge funds typically invest, “when default rates are
high, recovery rates are low or when spreads are significantly wide…” (Chen, Gonzalez,
et al, 2008). In the opinion of Scott Tross, an expert on foreclosure law, hedge funds are
the largest buyers of distressed debt as they demand a high return, which distressed debt
has the potential to deliver, (Bergsman, 2006).
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A recent research article evaluated the return expectation of value added and
opportunistic investments. Typically, these investments target a wide range of
commercial properties involve a high degree of risk and potential for value creation. The
goal of value added real estate funds is to achieve a 12-18 percent return, while
opportunistic funds look to generate returns in excess of 18 percent IRR, with a much
shorter investment horizon. Typically, these funds have a high degree of leverage, which
along with market timing and cheap debt are the primary return drivers, (Shilling and
Wurtzebach, 2010). In a related study, (Sterling, Fridson and Kong, 2009), the authors
studied the comparable returns of distressed bonds rated double-B with an index of
distressed bond investments. The results indicated that distressed double-B sample
generated a return of 54.38% compared to a negative (-17.42%) return for the distressed
index in a bear market. The investment implications for distressed debt manager in the
present market, characterized with rising default rates, is that investment in double-B
distressed segment has the potential for driving portfolio returns.

Investor Motivations
The NPL investor’s motivations may be long-term, short-term, or anywhere in
between. The investor may purchase the loans to hold until maturity after a work-out
with borrower has been reached; or they may be attempting to capitalize on a perceived
mispricing in the loan and realize their investment return through immediate sale to
another buyer. Interestingly, Tom Barrack of Colony Capital notes the majority of
secondary market CRE debt buyers are presently focusing on yield, rather than residual
value (Barrack, 2010). In Mr. Barrack’s blog, he states that, “near zero interest rates and
bank borrowings are fueling leveraged returns to financial buyers on fixed income
19

instruments at values which are solely focused on some positive cash flow fortified with
zero interest rate borrowings and purchasers are unfazed by maturity date shortfalls.”
Investors can also exploit economies of scale and scope if they specialize in
purchasing NPL’s and obtain a critical mass where cost per workout decreases materially
(Schafer, 2010). Most significant to commercial real estate NPL investors is the ability to
speculate on and acquire undervalued CRE at a discount. Many CRE investors have
employed a “loan-to-own” strategy with enormous success by purchasing nonperforming senior commercial real estate mortgages, commencing foreclosure
proceedings, bidding on the property at public auction, and if successful, adding the
property to its investment portfolio to pursue whatever value creation strategy that
appropriately fits the investor’s goals and risk-tolerance (Appendix A). The purchase of
the non-performing mortgage prior to foreclosure gives investors a significant advantage
in the auction process by providing the investor with superior information about the
property through its position as a secured creditor. Commercial mortgages also typically
contain a “lender in possession clause.” This clause gives the lender automatic right of
possession of the property after a borrower defaults on the loan. The “lender in
possession clause” allows the lender to control the maintenance, leasing and other general
property level issues leading up to the foreclosure process. This clause may allow the
loan-to-own lender/investor to prevent loss of value in the property during a prolonged
foreclosure process (Geltner, 2001). Most importantly, the investor can bid full face
value of the allowed secured claim as opposed to a discounted purchase price during the
auction proceedings, giving the senior creditor a significant advantage in the foreclosure
auction (Schafer, 2007).
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While most buyers today are looking to obtain access to the asset through any
borrower default, others are finding attractive risk adjusted yields with an immunization
strategy (Appendix A). One such group is Prudential’s Capital Partner’s Mezzanine
Fund. Prudential will purchase non-performing hotel loans and extend the loan, modify
terms such as levels of escrow collections, and work with the borrower to create a
structure that will allow for attractive yield through maturity. Those with equity positions
in the underlying property are also stepping up to purchase the non-performing debt.
Inasmuch as equity owner/managers typically know the asset best, they are usually in a
position to make the most attractive risk-adjusted offer.
High profile transactions tend to be generating the most investor interest today.
Loans with unpaid balances of over $25M are seeing the most activity and investor
interest. Smaller notes, with unpaid balances between $10M and $15M are typically
being extended or modified, rather than sold. Large investment funds are seeking to
obtain “trophy” assets that rarely come to market and have a history of strong operations
in supply constrained markets (Appendix A). Table 3 has identified the major investment
funds focusing on distressed hotel assets and loans.
While investor strategies and tactics associated with distressed debt vary with the
individual situation, a relatively recent empirical study on the investor objectives clearly
categorizes the two broad strategies adopted by investors in distressed debt. The study
surveyed 364 institutional investors of which 82 invested in distressed debt, (Harner,
2008). A summary of the relevant findings from the study are outlined below.
•

Survey results point to an increase in the amount of assets allocated by investors
to distressed debt and a sentiment to increase investments.
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•

Approximately 72 percent of the respondents indicated that their investment
horizon for distressed debt before liquidating was within 24 months, with about
50 percent indicating a liquidation period between 10 and 18 months.

•

Based on the top three debt investment preferences, respondents identified their
debt investment preferences as, senior secured bank debt (35%), high yield bonds
(26%), and mezzanine loans (15.5%). Approximately 78 percent indicated that
they invested in multiple tranches of debt.

•

The two primary investment strategies adopted by investors in distressed debt
were the use of their debt holdings to influence board and management decisions
and secondly to acquire a controlling interest in the firm. More than 70 percent of
the respondents noted that they try to exert influence through controlling the
operational strategy of the investment. A majority of those using the debt
investment to acquire a controlling interest in the firm used the “loan to own”
strategy (68%).

Two other studies focused on the competitive advantage that potentially drive
superior returns for opportunistic investors. These focus on specific qualities or traits of
investors in distressed investments, versus investment strategies. As noted by Gilson
(1995), success may be attributed to their superior quality to value firms assets based on
their expertise in getting information, and industry knowledge. Furthermore, their
experience gives them a competitive advantage for negotiating, bargaining and exerting
their influence as “rescue capital” by discounting the purchase price. Finally, the
opportunistic investor’s previous experience in the arena provides them insight into the
true risks of the venture and they conduct a thorough due diligence to mitigate their risk
exposure. A similar argument is extended by Noe and Rebello (2003) whose research
shows that a vulture’s reputation for toughness allows them to limit the value distributed
to other claimants. A large part of this skewed negotiating position is a result of
information asymmetry on the value of the distressed debt. In this regard, the vulture’s
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private information allows the firm to become marginal creditors which maximize their
leverage in debt-purchase negotiations.

Process of Buying and Sourcing Distressed CRE Loans from Banks
CRE NPL whole loan sales undertaken by traditional banking institutions
typically follow two distinct legal structures for execution. NPLs can be transferred to a
purchaser individually by assignment in what is referred to as an Asset Deal. On the
other hand, NPLs can be placed in a company that is subsequently sold to the purchaser
in what is referred to as a Share Deal (Schafer, 2010).

Public Private Distressed Loan Partnerships Today
Today’s CRE NPL investment market is extremely similar to the S&L era market.
The FDIC has replaced the RTC as the government’s representative. Meanwhile, many
of the same opportunity funds that profited from the S&L crisis are among those active
today. According to data compiled by Bloomberg, some NPL sales are occurring for
only 22 cents on the dollar. Today’s sales often include no-interest financing from the
agency responsible for insuring the mortgage. However, the FDIC is attempting to avoid
the criticisms of the RTC era that the government allowed assets to go for valuations far
below their inherent investment worth (Keehner, 2010). It is doing so by keeping up to
50% stakes in the loan portfolios and demanding as much as 70% of loan sale gains
(Bloomberg). Innovative partnership structures are helping the FDIC obtain its goal of
compensating taxpayers for the risk they take on. For example, a recent deal involving
the sale of a company holding $4.5 billion of non-performing commercial real estate
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loans, originally held by failed Chicago lender Corus Bankshares Inc. to an investment
fund led by Starwood Capital, required Starwood to agree to an “equity kicker” with the
FDIC (Table 2). In this transaction, the equity kicker will increase the FDIC’s stake in
the deal from 60 percent to 70 percent if the Starwood led investment fund makes back
twice its initial invested capital, Starwood is then required to pay the FDIC a 25%
internal rate of return in addition to whatever return they are already entitled to (Keehner,
2010). At the property level, an example of value creation through FDIC leverage is the
Carlos Ott-designed Artech condominium “loan-to-own” acquisition in Aventura,
Florida. In order to facilitate higher sale prices of condo units, the FDIC pledged up to
$1 billion in working capital to help the Starwood investment fund complete construction
and sell the units at a price favorable to the FDIC-Starwood partnership (Keehner, 2010).
The FDIC alone sold about 3,500 commercial real estate loans with a book value
of more than $6.1 billion last year; combined with other agency loan sales, the total
amount for 2009 was $10 billion. However, as of April 14, 2010, over $8 billion in total
loan sales have been completed for 2010 (Heschmeyer, 2010). The FDIC has arranged
over $850 million in interest-free government financing to support these 2010 deals.
Much like the RTC priority of claims structuring, private equity buyers cannot keep any
profits from loan sales or restructuring until the FDIC’s interest-free financing has been
repaid in full. FDIC interest-free financing has received some criticism by members of
government and academia for artificially increasing prices by as much as 20% leaving the
FDIC’s core responsibility, the insurance of depositor’s accounts in national banks,
threatened. Linus Wilson, a finance professor at University of Louisiana stated that the
FDIC could take significant losses if private equity fund managers cannot recover as
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much of the NPLs as they expect. Wilson suggests that a better structure would eliminate
the government’s stake completely and provide no agency seller financing. He reasons
that this would protect the FDIC’s core responsibilities and allow the agency to collect
cash much more quickly (Keehner, 2010). FDIC Chairwoman Sheila Blair defended the
interest-free financing stating that it is necessary to help pricing move to an equilibrium
level that clears the market. FDIC spokesman Andrew Gray affirmed that the agency
seller financing is made on a deal-by-deal basis and will not necessarily continue if
conditions within the market change favorable going forward (Keehner, 2010).

Distressed Loan Acquisition Due Diligence
Extensive due diligence on behalf of investment buyers is absolutely necessary
for an investment fund to achieve success in a CRE NPL purchase. In addition to
thorough examination of the loan itself and the underlying property serving as collateral,
investment buyers must engage in a thorough legal review of all applicable loan
documents and the servicing records. The buyer should research the public record to
confirm that all filings and recordings have been properly recorded in order to ensure the
priority of the noteholder’s security position. According to distressed real estate attorney
Charles Weiss, buyers should: “(1) review the required payment terms, including the
timing and amounts of required payments and whether any party with assets other than
the primary real estate collateral is liable for payments through a payment guaranty; (2)
verify the purported collateral for the loan and that the collateral is properly granted to
the loan holder; and (3) thoroughly review all remedy exercise provisions to ensure that
they are complete, unambiguous, and adequate in scope, and that they are effective and
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enforceable under applicable state law to achieve their intended purposes. For instance,
for properties in states providing for non-judicial foreclosure, the Buyer should ensure
that all requirements necessary for a non-judicial foreclosure are complied with, since
judicial foreclosures are typically far more expensive and lengthy (Weiss, 2010).”
Investment buyers should also review “carve-out guaranties found in the
mortgage. A carve-out guaranty, also known as a “bad-boy” guaranty (Appendix B),
exists in a non-recourse commercial real estate mortgage to trigger full recourse against
the borrower in cases of fraud, declaring bankruptcy, misapplication of funds, transfers of
the mortgaged property, other egregious behaviors (Falby, 2010). Reviewing the carveout provision helps ensure that sufficient incentive exists to prevent such behaviors
detrimental to the value of the collateral property and therefore the loan. Verifying that
all material documents were executed properly, notarized, and witnessed is also essential.
Investment buyers should evaluate the background, financial position, track record, and
credibility of the borrower to determine the likelihood of their performance under a
restructuring or their cooperation in giving back the collateral. A buyer’s declaration of
bankruptcy or commencement of adversarial litigation would also destroy the loan value
and significantly increase investment buyer costs. The probability of this happening
should be evaluated. Investment buyers should review the history of the loan and read all
available correspondence between the borrower and the note holder. The investment
buyer should be on the lookout for any acts that might give rise to a borrower’s argument
that certain requirements or covenants of the mortgage document/note had been waived
expressly or implied by informal written agreement, course of dealing, or oral agreement.
For example, a note holder’s failure to exercise remedies in response to continual,

26

material defaults by the borrower or accepting partial payments and deficient
performance on non-monetary obligations could constitute a case that modification of the
loan occurred. The buyer should also be looking for any evidence that would show the
likelihood of the borrower taking action against the lender for any lender liability claim.
Examples of lender liability claims include, not giving required notices before exercising
remedies, acting in bad faith, taking a commanding role in the borrower’s business to its
ultimate detriment, or negligently administering the loan. Consequences of lender
liability claims can be very punitive. While this article focuses primarily on senior nonperforming mortgage investment, it is important to note that lower security interest NPL
purchasers must engage in the same due diligence, perhaps to an even greater extent.
Distressed mezzanine loan buyers must fully analyze the relative collateral
positions, duties and rights of all other lenders applicable under intercreditor agreements.
Moreover, if a mezzanine buyer takes ownership of the borrowing entity’s corporate
stock (or whatever collateral pledged in the mezzanine agreement), then the buyer
becomes subject to all contractual and tort-based liabilities of the owning entity.
Therefore the buyer should review and analyze all entity level, in addition to property
level, information available. One positive attribute to subordinated CRE NPL investment
such as mezzanine loans, is that mezzanine debt foreclosure is governed by the Uniform
Commercial Code, rather than a judicial sale. This greatly reduces the time it takes for
the investment holder of the NPL to obtain the collateral. Mezzanine foreclosures
typically take as little as three to four weeks. Senior CRE NPL foreclosure usually
requires at least six weeks and can sometimes take six months or longer. No matter
where the opportunistic CRE NPL investor chooses to acquire along the security-interest
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spectrum, extensive due diligence is critical to a successful deal and an attractive riskadjusted return (Weiss, 2010).

Issues Specific to Distressed Hospitality Loan Acquisition
One of the largest impediments to increased distressed hotel loan sales is the
industry’s reliance on management agreements. Hotel management agreements (HMAs)
spell out the relationship between the hotel management company and hotel owner. Of
particular importance to hospitality debt purchasers are the provisions in the
Subordination, Non-Disturbance, and Attornment Agreement (SNDA). Ensuring that
the hotel management agreement is subordinate to the mortgagee’s claim is essential to
prudent debt acquisition and hedging the purchaser’s risk. Most hotel loans contain a
non-disturbance provision with the hotel management company. Lenders usually agree
not to disturb the management company’s control/quiet enjoyment of the hotel, and not to
terminate the hotel management agreement executed by the owner (Butler, 2008). Thus
far, such non-disturbance agreements have withstood judicial scrutiny despite numerous
challenges (Barrack, 2010). The Non-Disturbance clause of the SNDA causes few issues
while the loan is performing. However, when the loan goes into default, the clause can
severely affect flexibility and asset value (Butler, 2008). Special servicers or banks
looking to foreclose or sell hospitality loans may face further losses by not being able to
deliver the asset free and clear of a management contract (Barrack, 2010). Eighty percent
of distressed hotel debt or equity buyers over the past 20 years were either branded hotel
management companies or a joint venture of a capital source with a branded hotel
management company (Butler, 2008). Clearly, asset values are greatly affected when the
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largest purchaser (strategic buyers), do not have the right to terminate a competitor’s
management contract and substitute their own (Appendix A).

Liquidity in Today’s Marketplace
Some of the world’s largest commercial real estate brokerage houses are
experiencing a boom in business related to the flood of CRE NPL assets entering the
market. Cushman & Wakefield, Colliers International, and CB Richard Ellis have all
established in-house asset recovery groups to work though the distressed debt (and
property) expected to enter the market (Fleming, 2010). Troubled assets flowing into the
asset recovery group accounted for over a third of Colliers International’s 2009 deal flow.
So far in 2010, CB Richard Ellis has been tasked with selling over $5 billion in nonperforming CRE debt. Brokerage companies are aggressively recruiting professionals
with experience working through the Savings and Loans crisis. Brokerage firms note that
in the RTC era, the federal government was much more concerned with quick resolution
of troubled assets than they were with price. In today’s environment, the federal
government and financial institutions have remembered the huge profits made by RTC
opportunity fund investors and are remaining much more steadfast in trying to hold onto
non-performing loans to workout in-house, rather than by selling them. New banking
regulations set forth in the FDIC’s “Policy Statement on Prudent Commercial Real Estate
Loan Workouts” exempt banks from mark-to-market write-downs on previously
“impairment-required” categories of CRE debt where residual value is significantly
diminished (Barrack, 2010). “Doubtful assets” are defined by the FDIC as, “an asset that
has all the weaknesses inherent in one classified substandard with the added characteristic
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that the weaknesses make collection or liquidation in full, on the basis of currently
existing facts, conditions, and values, highly questionable and improbable (FDIC).” Such
doubtful assets were previously required to be marked-to-market under the previously
subscribed to policy statement, “Review and Classification of Commercial Real Estate
Loans (June, 1993, FDIC).” Regulations that permit banks to not recognize problem
CRE loans significantly diminishes transaction volume within the asset class and
prevents natural economic forces from cleaning out the market and restoring liquidity to
global financial markets (Appendix A). Spencer Levy of CB Richard Ellis states that,
“banks and special servicers have the ability to hold on longer to non-performing loans
this time than in the early 90s, and they’re going to (Fleming, 2010).” However debate in
the brokerage community will rigorously continue as to if, and when, major nonperforming commercial real estate loan capitulation by American financial institutions
will occur (Fleming, 2010).

Methods of Sale
For regulated institutions, the motivation as to how loan sales are carried out is
somewhat self-preservation. The institution needs to be able to demonstrate to regulators
that they are broadly marketing their assets to the highest bidder. This is severely
limiting direct sales to specific buyers. On the other hand, non-regulated institutions and
CMBS Special servicers focus on maximizing total value (net of marketing/closing
costs). These groups are more inclined to engage in direct sales with select buyers. To
accommodate the enormous demand for CRE NPLs and the bank’s need for professional
marketing, some loan sale advisors resorted to technology to improve the availability of
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information and create a more efficient auction process for investors. The Carlton Group,
a global real estate investment bank, recently launched CEX Mobile, an internet based
auction program that allows potential property bidders to access due diligence
information and make bids for loans using their Blackberrys or iPhones. According to
Carlton Chairman Howard Michaels, Carlton is currently selling $2 billion in CRE NPLs
and REO assets. Bidders are requiring 24/7 access from their handhelds. Collateral
information, servicing files, and loan documents are all available for download through
the CEX program (Kalette, 2010). Other debt auction websites such as DebtX have seen
significant traffic and volume. Traditional marketed sales through Requests for Proposal
continue to be effective, but are gradually being replaced with technological innovations
(Appendix A). The commercial real estate industry clearly has adapted their business
model with resounding flexibility, speed, and execution.

Conclusion
With most, if not all, sectors of commercial real estate property investment showing
deteriorating fundamentals and a significant lack of financing interest, the market for
distressed commercial real estate backed debt is burgeoning. According to Bruce Lowrey
of RockBridge Capital, “loose monetary policy has pushed rates down to near zero and
allowed borrowers with floating rate loans to meet debt service, those with fixed rate debt
or balloons maturing may not fare as well”. Conditions today in the CRE debt markets
are extremely similar to the RTC era. It is not surprising that many of the RTC era’s
leading investors are thriving today. Sourcing, negotiating, and closing attractive, nonperforming commercial real estate loans is extremely difficult and requires connections,
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credibility, and a large investment capital base. However, there is the potential to earn
very attractive risk-adjusted returns by sophisticated commercial real estate investors
with the experience, knowledge, risk-appetite, tenacity, and determination to work
through the enormous construction, performance, and litigation issues surrounding the
underlying properties.
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Table 1
Participants in Phone Survey Interviews and Industry Resources
NAME

TITLE

AFFILIATION

Mark Bratt

Developers
Diversified Realty
Corporation

Bruce Lowrey

Executive Vice
President and
Chief Investment
Officer
SVP Mortgage
Banking
Managing Director

Joel Hiser
Adam McGaughy

Principal
Vice President

Richard Conti

President

Angelo Stambules

Marriott
International, Inc.
RockBridge
Capital, LLC
Horwath HTL
Jones Lang
LaSalle Hotels
The Plasencia
Group

INTERVIEW
DATE
November 27, 2010

December 7, 2010
January 11, 2011
January, 2011
January, 2011
November, 2011
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Table 2
Recent Non Performing Hotel Loan Investments
Seller
Hilton
Lenders

Buyer
Blackstone Group

FDIC

Colony Capital and
Cogsville Group

FDIC

Pending

Columbia
Sussex

Blackstone Group

Wachovia
Corp

Blackstone Group

Morgan
Stanley Real
Estate Fund V

Investor Group:
CNL-AB by hedge
fund Paulson & Co

FDIC

Investor Group:
Northwest
Investments
managed by
Starwood Capital

Extended
Stay America

Investment Group:
Centerbridge,
Paulson & Co and
Blackstone
Lenders:
Hedgefund Silver
Point Capital,
Beach Point
Capital, Fidelity,
JP Morgan Chase

Six Flags Inc:
Amusement
Parks

Transaction Summary
In 2010, bought $3.8 Billion of Hilton Debt. Paid
cash $800 million buy $1.8 billion debt and
converted balance to preferred equity.
US$1.85 billion of distressed commercial real estate
loans auctioned by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation,
FDIC looking to sell $385 Million worth of hotel
mortgages collateralized by 45 hotels held by failed
Georgia based Silverton Bank
October 2010. Discounted purchase of junior
mezzanine debt for $300 million on 14 upscale
hotels owned by Columbia Sussex. The face value
of the Mezzanine debt was $500 Million.
Blackstone had sold these hotels to Columbia
Sussex for $1.3 Billion in 2006.
Purchase at a significant (undisclosed) discount to
face value of senior mezzanine debt from Wachovia
for $320 million. The debt is backed by 27 hotels
owned by Highland Hospitality, a hotel REIT. The
total debt load for Highland Hospitality is $1.7
Billion.
February, 2011, an agreement between Investor
Group and Morgan Stanley Real Estate Fund V to
take control of CNL through a foreclosure
proceeding. The transaction includes 8 very large
resorts. The transaction exchanged their $600
million of CNL’s corporate mezzanine debt for the
company’s equity. The properties were immediately
put into chapter 11 bankruptcy protection to stave
off senior secured lender claims.
Investor group paid $554 Million for asset of failed
Corus Bank. The assets consist of over 100 loan and
Real estate owned assets. FDIC will have a 60
percent ownership of Northwest investments which
will manage and turn around the non performing
assets. In addition FDIC will provide a zero interest
$1 billion working capital loan to complete projects
in the loan portfolio
Purchased Extended Stay America in a bankruptcy
auction for $3.93 billion in 2010.

Just ahead of bankruptcy filing in the summer of
2010, Six Flags reached a prenegotiated
reorganization plan with lenders to exchange its
debt for 92 percent equity in the new company after
it emerges from bankruptcy

Investment Strategy
Debt restructuring and purchase of its own
debt at a discount. Reducing debt load while
the economy recovers.
Public-Private Distressed REO Sale
Partnership. Opportunistic investment
strategy.
Public-Private Distressed REO Sale
Partnership.
Loan to Own opportunistic investment
strategy.

Loan to Own opportunistic investment
strategy.

Foreclosure sale and debt restructuring under
bankruptcy protection. This includes a debt to
equity swap and negotiations with current
lenders Investors hope to capitalize on the
upside potential of the iconic properties in the
portfolio, when they eventually sell.

Public-Private Distressed Sale Partnership.
The investor group purchased the assets at
approximately a 60% discount and expect to
monetize their investment by turning around
the distressed assets.

Bankruptcy auction sale, and repositioning
for eventual sale.

Debt to Equity Swap

Source: Author
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Table 3
Hotel Acquisition Funds: Distressed Asset Focus
COMPANY

Brightside Acquisitions
Group
Danielldevelopment.com

NAME OF
FUND
Blackstone Real
Estate Partners
IV
Brightside’s
Global
Opportunity Fund

Colony Capital
Colonyfinancial.com

Colony Financial
Inc.

US $308.25M
market cap
(3/1/2011)

Colony Capital
Colonyinc.com

Colony
Distressed Credit
Fund

US $1 billion

Blackstone Group
Backstonegroup.com

Concord Hospitality
Enterprises
Concordhotels.com
DLJ Real Estate Capital
Partners
Equity Global Investments
LLC
Equityinternational.com
Geolo Capital
Geolo.com
KABR Group/Capstone
Realty
Lone Star Funds
Lonestarfunds.com
Macfarlan Capital Partners
Macfarlan.com
NextBridge Capital
Nextbridgegroup.com
RockBridge Capital
Rockbridgecapital.com
Starwood Property Trust
Starwoodpropertytrust.com

EQUITY SIZE

TARGET

US $10.6 billion

hotels, global

US $700 million

Unfinished or distressed hotels; highly motivated
sellers; REIT-quality Luxury, Upper Upscale,
Upscale, Midscale with F&B, Midscale w/o F&B
acquiring, originating, investing in,
financing and managing a diversified
portfolio of real estate-related debt
investments, with a primary focus on
commercial mortgage loans (which may
be performing, sub-performing or nonperforming loans),
Performing products from financial institutions
selling at distressed prices, including CMBS and
first mortgages

US $300 million

DLJ Real Estate
Capital Partners
IV
Zell Credit
Opportunities
Fund LP

KABR Capstone
Distressed Debt
Fund
Loan Star Real
Estate Fund II
Macfarlan
Special Situations
Fund I

US $200 million

Repositioning, distressed debt, development

US $625 million

Distressed securities backed by assets

US $150 million

Distressed hospitality assets in 3.5, 4-star category.

Distressed
mortgages,
mostly hotels
US $10 billion
target
US $300 million
target
US 100 million

RockBridge
Hospitality Fund
IV LP

Distressed hotels and debt

US $160 million

US $830 million
IPO target

Distressed commercial real estate and commercial
mortgage backed securities
Distressed properties, high-end hotels

Repositioning, distressed debt, development
(unfinished/motivated seller)
Hotels with total transaction capitalization between
US $10million and US$50 million
Distressed debt opportunities

Source: www.Hotel NewsNow.com
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Appendix A
Survey Questions and Summary Responses
1) How would you describe the investment market for non-performing hotel loans
today?
The market for distressed hotel loans is crowded with a large number of well-capitalized
investment funds pursuing limited opportunities. Regulator’s reluctance to force institutions to
sell has significantly decreased available investment opportunities.

2) What major barriers exist today that are restricting non-performing hotel loan
transaction volume?
Regulators are cognizant of the heavy criticism they received resulting from the massive profits
realized by distressed loan buyers in the RTC-era. As such, they have significantly relaxed
requirements for banks to sell their distressed assets. Extend-and-pretend continues to be the
resolution of choice. This allows banks to defer recognizing the losses in hopes that the asset’s
value returns to acceptable underwriting levels.

3) Who are the most active sellers of non-performing hotel loans in the market
today? What are the primary motivations of those sellers?
The FDIC and non-regulated financial institutions are the most active sellers of non-performing
hotel loans in the market today. In unforced hold-sell decisions for non-regulated institutions, it is
accretive to sell whenever the net present value (NPV) of the sale proceeds would be higher than
the present value of the net cash inflows from the loan.

4) Who are the top buyers of non-performing hotel loans? Briefly describe the
acquisition requirements and investment motivation for these buyers.
Private-equity funds remain the largest buyers of non-performing hotel loans. Many of the same
groups from the RTC-era are hoping to repeat their success during the most-recent cycle. The
largest investment funds are seeking to obtain “trophy” assets that rarely come to market and have
a history of strong operations in supply constrained markets.

5) What strategies are most common among each top buyer group to unlock value
from the investment (loan-to-own, discounted payoffs, loan modification, etc.)?
Most buyers are looking to obtain access to the asset through any borrower default. The loan-toown strategy is by far the most common in the market today. However, distressed CRE owners
remain active in discounted payoffs on their own loans. Yield buyers who seek to modify
purchased loans are also prominent.
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6) Briefly describe the most common processes of buying and sourcing debt today
(Auction, Direct Sales, Marketed Sales).
Auction Sales: The selling party will arrange with a brokerage such as the Carlton Group to
arrange an auction with pre-screened buyers. This is by far the most expensive option. The
highest, qualified bidder will prevail. Technology and web-based auction platforms are beginning
to take a much more significant role.
Direct Sales: The selling party will reach out to a select, credited buyer to assess interest.
Interested parties with respond to the selling party with an Letter of Intent (LOI) and discussions
will proceed from there.
Marketed Sale: Requests for Proposals (RFP) will be sent to a group of accredited buyers. While
this process remains effective, it is gradually being replaced with technological innovations.

7) How does today’s non-performing hotel loan investment market differ from the
RTC era?
Regulators are not pressuring banks to sell distressed assets. This has significantly decreased loan
sale volume. Allowing banks to hold the assets has deferred losses and allowed troubled
institutions more time to shore up their balance sheets.

8) What impact do hotel management and franchise agreements have on nonperforming hotel loan values?
Hotel management agreements (HMAs) with SNDA provisions preventing termination usually
have a negative impact on loan pricing. The presence of a “comfort letter”, which restricts the
franchisor from terminating the agreement upon foreclosure, will usually have a positive impact
on loan pricing. This letter ensures that the property will remain stable. Of course, the impact of
HMAs and franchise agreements will vary on a case-by-case basis driven primarily by the
investment buyer’s motivations.

9) From a legal perspective, what is unique to non-performing hotel loan that must
be addressed in the due diligence process compared to other non-performing
commercial real estate debt?
Analyzing the hotel management agreements (HMA’s) associated with the underlying property is
of utmost importance. The mortgagee’s ability to terminate a management contract could be
limited by provisions in the SNDA. Given the fact that most distressed hotel debt buyers have
been branded hotel companies, this could seriously diminish the pool of potential buyers and have
a negative impact on pricing.
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Appendix B
Lexicon of Distressed Debt Terms
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Source: http://www.1stservicesolutions.com/reference_materials.html
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